TY - GEN
T1 - Diagnosis of route leaks among autonomous systems in the Internet
AU - Siddiqui, M. S.
AU - Montero, D.
AU - Yannuzzi, M.
AU - Serral-Gracia, R.
AU - Masip-Bruin, X.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the defacto inter-domain routing protocol in the Internet. It was designed without an inherent security mechanism and hence is prone to a number of vulnerabilities which can cause large scale disruption in the Internet. Route leak is one such inter-domain routing security problem which has the potential to cause wide-scale Internet service failure. Route leaks occur when Autonomous systems violate export policies while exporting routes. As BGP security has been an active research area for over a decade now, several security strategies were proposed, some of which either advocated complete replacement of the BGP or addition of new features in BGP, but they failed to achieve global acceptance. Even the most recent effort in this regard, lead by the Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) working group (WG) of IETF fails to counter all the BGP anomalies, especially route leaks. In this paper we look at the efforts in countering the policy related BGP problems and provide an analytical insights into why they are ineffective. We contend a new direction for future research in managing the broader security issues in the inter-domain routing. In that light, we propose a naive approach for countering the route leak problem by analyzing the information available at hand, such as the RIB of the router. The main purpose of this paper was to position and highlight the autonomous smart analytical approach for tackling policy related BGP security issues.
AB - Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the defacto inter-domain routing protocol in the Internet. It was designed without an inherent security mechanism and hence is prone to a number of vulnerabilities which can cause large scale disruption in the Internet. Route leak is one such inter-domain routing security problem which has the potential to cause wide-scale Internet service failure. Route leaks occur when Autonomous systems violate export policies while exporting routes. As BGP security has been an active research area for over a decade now, several security strategies were proposed, some of which either advocated complete replacement of the BGP or addition of new features in BGP, but they failed to achieve global acceptance. Even the most recent effort in this regard, lead by the Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) working group (WG) of IETF fails to counter all the BGP anomalies, especially route leaks. In this paper we look at the efforts in countering the policy related BGP problems and provide an analytical insights into why they are ineffective. We contend a new direction for future research in managing the broader security issues in the inter-domain routing. In that light, we propose a naive approach for countering the route leak problem by analyzing the information available at hand, such as the RIB of the router. The main purpose of this paper was to position and highlight the autonomous smart analytical approach for tackling policy related BGP security issues.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84906311231
U2 - 10.1109/SaCoNeT.2014.6867765
DO - 10.1109/SaCoNeT.2014.6867765
M3 - Contribución a la conferencia
AN - SCOPUS:84906311231
SN - 9781479951963
T3 - 2014 International Conference on Smart Communications in Network Technologies, SaCoNeT 2014
BT - 2014 International Conference on Smart Communications in Network Technologies, SaCoNeT 2014
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2014 International Conference on Smart Communications in Network Technologies, SaCoNeT 2014
Y2 - 18 June 2014 through 20 June 2014
ER -