Influencia del conflicto de agencia en el desempeño financiero: la experiencia de un país emergente

The separation of management and ownership is a challenge faced by many companies, especially during their initial stages of growth. The alternatives of independent or owner management pose risks and benefits, particularly when the interests of the agent and the organization are at odds, a situation known as “agency conflict.” Within this context, the present study aims to determine the influence of agency conflict on the financial performance of Ecuadorian companies in the textile sector during the period 2014-2018. Through descriptive and comparative analysis, we establish the main characteristics of the financial management of independently managed companies and those under an owner-management approach. A regression model is estimated in order to analyze the effect of agency conflict on business performance. Findings indicate that agency conflict has a negative impact on organizational performance. However, this relationship varies according to firm size. Hence, larger firms experience a positive effect of agency conflict on business performance, while in small firms is the opposite. Furthermore, liquidity, indebtedness, the presence of agency conflict, and its interaction with firm size are identified as predictors of financial performance.